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Aristotle' s Three Cities and the Problem of Faction

Abstract

Aristotle describes the polis as a self-sufficient compound. Its regime, he says, is
responsible for shaping the whole character of the city' s people. B ut rarely is the city
unified in its parts, and the formative power of the regime is not always this extensive.
There are in fact three kinds of cities depicted in the Politics. They differ by the degree
of partnership tying city members together. Accordingly, the problem of faction and its
cure differs for each: for sorne cities, where the regime is unitary, the cure is consent; for
others, with mixed regimes, it is participation; but for the ideal city it is homogeneity.

Aristotle's Three Cities and the Problem of Faction

l. Unity, Diversity, and Virtue
Aristotle is never more voluble in his criticism of Plato than when the subject is political
unity. In the Politics Aristotle charges that Plato's Socrates wrongly imposed on the city the unity
appropriate to a single individual, where all of the body's parts feel pleasure and pain together, orto
a single family, where all family members say "mine" and "not mine" about the same things. The
city is by its nature a self-sufficient association, and too much unity destroys the diversity necessary
for perfected communal existence.
Aristotle explains that the city is self-sufficient in two respects, materially and spiritually.
In book 7 of the Politics, he lists severa! functions necessary to the city's survival, observing that
"the city is not any chance multitude (tuchon plethos), but one self-sufficient with a view to life"
(7.8.8).1 Here Aristotle is speaking of material self-sufficiency: the city must provide itself with
sustenance, artifacts, defense, finance, worship, and rule--all just to live.2 The city, Aristotle
observes, comes into being for the sake of mere life (1.2.8). By diversity of population and
specialization of trades, it continues the work of self-preservation begun in the household and the
village. But the special function and final end of the city is to cultivate man 's talent for reason and
speech, orto provide people with what Aristotle famously says is a good life (l.2.8.). Thus the city
attains its self-sufficiency (autarkeia) primarily in terms of the soul of man and only secondarily in
terms of the body. Diversity is again important because it is a source of disagreement, and the
resolution of disagreements among different but equal people requires that city members actas
moral reasoners (Yak, 1985, pp. 101-12). The family and the village, on the other hand, obviate the
moral development of men because as traditional and hierarchical communities all matters therein
are well settled and accepted, and political authority is mostly beyond challenge.3 It is, therefore, a
mistake to model the city after the family and to base the city's unity on the sameness of its
members: for the city necessarily is a compound (syntheton) consisting of dependent and
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complementary parts.4 The interaction of these diverse parts, to repeat, helps to perfect menas
moral beings by demanding of them reflection and .conversation about the advantageous and the just
(1.2.1).5 And this achievement--far more than the division of labor--explains why the city is a selfsufficient association. Accordingly, civic unity, as urged by Socrates, rather than the greatest good
fÓr cities, in fact destroys them (2.2.6-7):
... to seek to unify the city exces·sively is not good. For a household is
more self-sufficient than one person, and á city than a household; and a
city tends to come into being at the point when the partnership formed by
a multitude is self-sufficient. If, therefore, the more self-sufficient is more
choiceworthy, what is less a únity is more choiceworthy than what is more
a uriity (2.2 ..8).
•
Aristotle's apparent complaint then against the éity of the Republic is that its institutions impose a
oneness of life and thought that suffocates the individual and stifles his moral growth.6 Morality,
Aristotle believes, depeilds on diversity.
But thére is a limit to how much diversity the.city ·can absorb and still áccomplish its moral·
purpose .. Larger communities, such as empires, ~ undoubtedly '.'less a.unity" than the polís, but
.

.

.

.

Aristotle does not say of them tha:tthey are.the most natural associations. The explanation,.
apparently, is that their greater size and diversity compromises their self-sufficiency. The problem
with empires, but more obviously with nation-states of today, is that they are too heterogeneous for
virtue to be the public business. Because the citizens of large states are divided in their beliefs,
moral discourse among them will rarely lead to communal agreement. And so the argument is
made, and repeated as a maxim of liberal democracy, that poli tics cannot legislate morality,
meaning that moral questions should be confined to lesser associations (to religious congregations
and families especially) where their investigation is less a danger to public peace. Aristotle says
that large states--in fact large cities--are unlikely to have aregime (politeia): "[the city] that is made
up of too many persons is with respect to the necessary things self-sufficient like a nation, but is not
a city; for it is not easy for a regime to be present" (7.4.11). A regime exists where there is
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agreement about who should rule and agreement about the community's way oflife (4.11.3).
Where there is instead competing life-styies that either oppress or tolerate one another, there is no
regime, at least norie that is complete. Ánd where theie is no regime, it may be best that moral
disputes remain more or less private and that the full potential of the political assóciation--a
common life of virtue--not be attempted. But to abandon public virtue is to retreat from selfsufficiency; accordingly the large state, with its greater diversity of people, is less seif-sufficient
than the smail polis. Ii can· therefore be inferred from Aristotle that excessive size and_excessive
controversy are hindrances to human development since the lack of consensus results in the
privatization of morality and the end of public reasorting about it.
There is; however, ~other criterion for determining the ~primal ·size of states. Small,
.

.

.

.

•

unified cities and large, di verse nations have in common the fact that each affords a remedy for the •
problem of faction ·cstasis). Socrates, in the Republic, places a premium on civic unity because he is
responding to the sophist's charge that political life is riven by faction and pqlitical rule ·the
instrument for class oppression (338c-339a).7. A unified and homogene~us city, Socrates reasons,
will rid politics of injustice by preventing the emergence of factious unrest (462a-d). • And with
respect to the benefits of size, James Madison explains in Federalist 10 that an extended republic is
the best defense against factions--which are otherwise permitted to exist--because the multiplication
and fragmentation of interests minimize the chances that any one faction will be a ruling majority
by itself. 8 The lessons taught are that either unity or diversity can provide interna! stability to a
regime. But Aristotle opts for a position seemingly midway between the homogeneity of Socrates'
Republic and the heterogeneity of Madison's extended republic.9 He does so for the sake of the
moral self-sufficiency of the polis, which, as noted, requires enough disagreement that people find it
necessary to ta1kabout right and wrong, but not so much disagreement that such ta1kis ruled
unacceptable for public debate. Because Aristotle dedicates the polis to the moral development of
citizens, he necessarily exposes it to a high degree of factional turbulence. Up to a point, Aristotle
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is accepting of faction. But how does he propose managing faction so as to stabilize the polis and
make ofita defensible form of association? This is the topic of the present paper.

II. Three Cities
The polis is a species of human association (koinonia); wühin the polis the re gime is a type
of rule. Before considering the polis and the problem of faction, sorne further discussion of the
regime will be necessary. Aristotle identifies four constitutive elements of a regime or politeia
(4.1.10). The first is the creation and ariangement of politicál offices: an assembly, council,
magistracies, courts, etc. The second is the distribution of these offices to particular groups or·
individuals--the rules of eligibility, in other words. •The third--and certainly most important--is the
location of sovereigri powe~ (kuros), or the·determination-of the regime's kind, be it democratic,
oligarchic, monarchic. The kind of regi~e is a function of citizenship, for the _citizensare the
governing body (politeuma), and the governing body is sovereign (3.6:1-2); In ari aristocracy the
aristocrats make up the citizenry and
are the repository of authoritative
power. Finally, there is the
.
.
matter of purpose_;each regime devotes itself to sorne end, such as freedom in a democracy.
Aristotle is known for the vast powers he attributes to the regime, much beyond the
distribution of benefits and the regulation of competing interests; for it is the business of the regime,
he says, to shape and mold the body politic (Newman, 1973, pp. 209-11 ). The expression body
politic, even though modero in its origin, is particularly apt since the people, as Aristotle suggests,
are like matter given form and identity by the regime (3.3.7-8). There are democratic people by
virtue of their common life in a democratic city--likewise oligarchic and aristocratic people. Each
is determined by its way of life--by its collective view of happiness expressed through what it
praises and blames, rewards and punishes; and this in turn is an issue settled by the choice of a
regime and manifested by the regime thereafter (Yak, 1985, p. 98). Aristotle comments, "For it is
through hunting for this [i.e., happiness] in a different manner and by means of different things that
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[groups of] individuals create ways of life and regimes that differ" (7.8.5).10
The above remarks speak to the social effect of the regime, that through its agency a
multitude becomes a single peopfo. But there is as well a political effect concerning the question of
rule. The affection, kind regard, or friendship.:-all translations of philia--that the regime spreads
among the community, and itself reflects, is á function of the people' s agreement about who should •
rule (N. E., 1167a34-1167b2) and toa lesser extent their agreenient about.matters of policy (N. E.,·
1167a27-33). A body_politic is defined by .this political agreement perhaps more so than by its
manners, habits, and traditions. People stand united as democrats if their régime is commonly
supported, oras oligarchs if oligarchy is what the people want. But }:lowfeasible is it for all the
people to want the sani.eregime_and for the regime~ therefore, to extend its authority to all the
people?
Having considered the unifying effect of the re gime, we return to Aristotle' s central
.

.

contention that the city is a compound made up of distinct and complementary paits. Aristotle
someti.mes remarks thanbe city, in truth, is two cities, consisting chiefly of the rich and the poor
(4.4.18-19, 5.11.32, 6.3.4). More familiar fuough is bis claim that the people are of two sorts, the
citizens, who are full partners in the regime, and the workers, whose labors are needed for the city's
survival but who are not themselves participants in the city's politics (3.1.6, 3.5.2, 4.4.14, 7.8.1-5).
There seems then not to be a single people over whom the regime exerts its influence and formative
power. Citizens are educated by the regime; they share in a common life and affirm its value; they
occupy the offices of state. But non-citizens are excluded from and untouched by this educational,
communal, and political activity. The democratic poor in an oligarchy are not products of the
regime in the same way that the ruling oligarchs are. By the same token, oligarchs and aristocrats
living under democracy retain the habits and aspirations of opposing regimes, even though
democratic equality affords them an equal role in political life. The regime then is less influential
than first impressions would suggest. But are we to conclude that oligarchs and democrats, rich and
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poor, cannot be members of the same one city, participants in and embodiments o_fthe same regime;
that there cannot be a common life of virtue between them? And is it the case, contrary to previous
beliefs, that th~ city's much vaunted diversity serves only its material needs, with the ruling rich
exti-acting labor from the multitude and the ruling poor expropriatirig wealth from the few? Are we
to understand that the spiritual benefits of city-living are reserved for those who are similar in kind
and who rule and are ruled in turn? What responsibility th~n has the regime toward free people who
are not citizens, or who are not the type of citizen (oligarchs in a democracy) that the regime
admires? Finally, how does the city, seen now to be divided.into the few aild the many, handle their
factious con tests for sovereign power?

_

• _ •.

•

_

.f

.

tll f/

¡.
'-.

1-

11

'11 M,'"] A_//'!

-

•

•

These quesnons anse because the c1ty, that p@A.uliu:Ba~ely
ni,tturaland self-suffic1ent
association, undergoes significant change through the course ofAristotle's discussioil of regimes.
The city is not alwáys the same; in fact there are three diffe~nt cities that Aristotle "refersto or has .
in mind. What distinguishes thém is the level of partnership at work amo~g the residents.1 _1City
members ·are necessarily partners _ina common enterprise, but the·enterprise can vary widely in its
scope. In the first place, and· as noted just ábove, ·the city can be two cities, its people divided into
rich and poor and joined together largely for material purposes. Those who are citizens, who rotate
in and out of office, are partners in a regime; their association is political. But those who are not
citizens, or who do not share in the spirit of the regime, are members of an economic alliance. The
city for them lacks the humanizing features which Aristotle describes and extols. These free
persons, to the degree that they are not resisting rule, are united contractually with their citizen
counterparts and are partners in the regime by virtue of their consent.
The second sort of city is a single city, although it attempts to combine both unity and
_diversity. The city is unified because rich and poor support the regime and share in its offices, and
because, in a modest way, the regime extends its educational authority to ali the people. But the
city is also diverse because social classes continue to exist. The regime best suited to such an
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association is a middle-class polity where the rich, the poor, and those of moderate means all share
in the exercise of power. Thus the members of this city are partners, not by consent alone, but by
their joint participation in the political life of the association.
The third type of city is Aristotle's ideal, or what he calls the city to be prayed for (7.4.1).
This too is a single city, but unlike the previous examplc;its unity derives from the absence of social
classes. Here there are not factions of rich and poor living in uneasy harmony; instead there are
citizens and slaves, between whom no partnership exists. The citizens engage in politics, or
perform sundry public duties, and are sufficiently alik.e that they look to be members of an extended
family, distinguished more by age than by property. The partnership among them is complete on ali
counts, for they agree about who should rule, participate severally in public affairs, and share a
common way of life, having been determined in their moral habits by the education of the re gime.

m. The Problem of Faction
It would be a mistake to suppose that Aristotle's middle way solution to the problem of
stasis, between communist homogeneity and liberal heterogeneity, is as focused and developed as
either of the extremes. Aristotle's remarks on the subject, while extensive, are often scattered,
pragmatic, and regime-basect.12 Moreover, Aristotle adopts a tack different from Socrates and
Madi son, concerning himself more with the stability of existing regimes than with the just treatment
of the ruled; thus the onus of Aristotle's analysis falls on rebellious subjects rather than on
oppressive rulers. Nevertheless, there is a constant core andan interest in justice in al1of what
Aristotle says, and, with a little flushing out, even a theory of faction. To help explain this theory,
the preceding three-city schema will be utilized.

l. Unitary Regimes

When the regime is unitary, that is to say, monarchic, aristocratic, oligarchic, democratic,
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tyrannical, 13 domestic tranquillity is maintained by the consent of the govemed and, to a lesser
degree, by cooperation among the rulers. The rulers include those who actually hold office and
those who are eligible, or the citizen body. The support of the citizen body for the regime is partly
taken for granted, although it is certainly possible that conflict among the privileged could occur. In
oligarchies, for instance, disloyalty and private ambition are serious causes of civil unrest (5.6.1-9).
Nevertheless, it is generally true that oligarchs support oligarchy, aristocrats aristocracy, and
democrats democracy for the simple reason that those who are citizens are favored by the regime.
The real source of trouble, therefore, in a unitary regime lies with the excluded. The democratic
many in an oligarchy are given to faction since they are removed from power and treated as
inferiors. Likewise1 the oligarchic few in a democracy think themselves mistreated since their
'i-(.

, i'

~

\_,~• '\"(\Y
~

putative superiority is unrecognized and their voices unheard arnidst the clamor of the multitude. Is
it conceivable then that the govemed would ever support a regime which excludes or ignores them?
Or do they merely suffer the rule of others while looking always for the opportunity to rebel? Is
faction an inevitable feature of unitary regimes and sedition the necessary outcome of alterations in
the balance of power?
However intractable the problem of faction, Aristotle does not despair of a resolution. In his
first effort to classify regimes, he distinguishes between correct regimes (orthai politeiai) and
deviant regimes (parekbebekuiai politeiai). Correct regimes, of which there are three, look only to
the common advantage, while deviant regimes promote the interest of the rulers. Insofar as a
regime is correct, it is possible for non-citizen inhabitants, the ruled, to give their consent, because
their interests are taken into account What though are their interests? The most important point to
note is that these people are not citizens bound morally and politically to the regime. Their
relationship instead is essentially that of an ally, and, as Aristotle explains in book 3, the objectives
of an alliance are more limited than those of a self-sufficing political partnership. Allies are joined
together for military and commercial purposes. Accordingly, the interests of those elements of the
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city united to others as allies are confined to the common ·defense and the exchange of goods, and
they are ~ell-treated if their person·s are secure and_thei.r property respected. •A good re gime -owes •
to this segment of the people a system of law that_provides them with rectificatory justice and that
fadlitates the transaction of business. Such is the position of democrats in an aristocracy. For them
law is "a compact [syntheke] ... a guarantor ámong one another of the just things". [t6n.dikai6n]
(3.9.8); whereas for aristocrats in an aristocracy law communicátes a way_of life; it is "the sort.of
thing to.make citizens good andjust" (3.9.8). Every city with a unitary regime is a compound (two
.

citi~s) which incl~des non-political elements. An_dthe consent of these eleinents can be won if their
contractual rights •are respected aqd théir material lives made tolerable and secure.
Even a good regime though is open.to factión and sedition. Aristotle lists numerous sources
of danger--some of them a~cidental, many of them a direct co~sequence of the city's"limited size-- •
and suggests precautions which might be taken. But the peculiar weakness of _monarchyand_
aristocracy is the relative transiénce of human superiority. Both regimes define themselves by the
excellence of their rulés·. _Butthese superior beings are liable to decline and corruption; and what is
justas likely, the _subjéctsunder them are capable of improvement and growth. The mere effect of
city-living is almost certain, in time, to turn mechanics, farmers, and slaves into politically
conscious individuals. Indeed, the one great advantage of the city over lesser associations is that it
has this edifying effect on people. To be sure, the full effect of city-living is reserved for those who
play the part of citizen, but sorne residual benefits necessarily come to those who simply watch. In
this regard Aristotle observes that kingship generally is an antique form of government, practiced
among people whose primitiveness is responsible for the king's seeming greatness. But as these
people emerge from barbarism, they have less need of a single ruler and are less able to find
someone who is outstanding relative to themselves. Aristotle's advice to kings is that they
surrender power gradually and gracefully (5.11.1-3), in part because kingship, by definition, is
consensual rule (5.10.37-38, 7.2.13, 3.14.12) and in part because the regime must fit the character of

.
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its people. It is almost a natural law with Aristotle that oríly a well-constructed regime is stable
(4.12.6, 5.7.5, ·6,6.4-5). And the fust rule of good construction is that the regime be suitable to the
people it rules, Thus even if the regime is just in dealing with its subjects, there is no reason to
suppose that these subjects will be forever content with their non-political existence. Man is by
nature a political animal, Aristotle avows (1.2.9, 3.6.3). Sorne mén at sorne times may be incapable
of poli tics, but life in a city will tend to awaken and develop what potential thére is. Kingship and
aristocracy can respond by co-opting the leadership of the rising class (Jaffa, 1972, p. 125), and by
doing so forestan their own demise and influence_the conduct of their succéssors. But what they
cannot do is perpetuate themselves, for the polis has a democratizing_effect that militates agairist the
long-term survival of non-egalitariari regimes.14
Among unitary regimes there are three listed as deviant: democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny ..
They are deviant because they serve the·interests of the rulers to the detriment of füe ruled. Their
injustice and abuse of power is fue central cause of stasis. Democrats, at the urging of demogogues,
expropriate the property of the wealthy few; oligarchs grow arrog.ant in office and despoil the many;
the tyrant, alone at the·top, thinks himself a:god to whom all is permitted. Each regime has a
defining principie or animating spirit that is defective in its own right and, if absolutized, leads the
regime to excess. In democracy this spirit is freedom (4.8.7). Aristotle observes that democratic
freedom manifests itself in two ways. First, freedom can be public and political, in which case it
means majority rule. When combined with numerical equality as a principie of justice, it
encourages the belief that "the multitude must necessarily have authority, and what is resolved by
the majority must be final and must be justice" (6.2.2). Justice is whatever the multitude wants,
even if what the multitude wants is to "distribute among themselves the things of the wealthy .... By
Zeus," declare the many, this expropriation is just since "it was resolved in just fashion by the
authoritative element" (3.10.1). Freedom also has a second meaning that is private and personal.
The democratic citizen is entitled to behave as he wishes, for subjection to the regime and its laws is
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treated as slavery (5.9.16, 6.2.3). Although disapproving of this attitude himself, Aristotle admits
that personal freedom, or civil liberty, is what democrats mainly desire and that political liberty is a
second-best altemative (6.2.4). In regard to the matter of faction, political liberty clearly carries the
seed of civil unrest; personal liberty though seems less directly a cause of stasis exceptas it
provokes the contempt of the few oras the lawlessness that might result necessitates deliverance by
a despotic government.
Wealth is the defining principie of oligarchy (4.8.7). Because the wealthy are few in
number, oligarchy has a small base of support. It is thus an unstable regime even if temperate in its
rule. B ut oligarchies are not famous for their temperance. The insolence and greed of oligarchs
usually leads to the oppression of the people, who are ready for revolt whenever sorne leader offers
to champion their cause. Oligarchies are also threatened from within, by dissension among the
rulers. The rulers quarrel, conspire, and rebel because they are timocrats who want honor and
position as testimonies of their worth. Indeed, Aristotle maintains that it is the many who seek
profit (6.4.3, 2.7.19) and that oligarchies are in fact small democracies if the rulers use office for the
sake of gain (6.7.7). The defining principie of oligarchy, therefore, is altered to include not only
wealth, but also pride. Since the pride of oligarchs cannot well be satisfied outside of politics, as
can the love of freedom of the democratic poor, the competition among oligarchs will be especially
intense. AccordinglY.,one notices that of the eight sources of domestic revolution (metabole) listed
in book 5, chapter 6, five concern the struggle for position and the suffering of perceived
indignities.
The essential feature of tyrannical government is rule without consent: the tyrant "may rule
not only willing persons, but also those who are unwilling; for if this is thrown away, so is the
tyranny" (5.11.18). Tyranny is inherently unstable, but Aristotle mentions two ways in which the
tyrant can preserve himself. Conventionally, the tyrant undertakes to weaken bis own subjects,
making them frightened and servile, distrustful of one another, and so poor and burdened with work
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that they are incapable of political action (5.1 L4-16). The other way, recomrnended though little
practiced,_is for the tyrant to imitate the king and thus win the admiration and affection of his
people .. This would require of the tyrant that he act as steward of the public funds and levy trocesfor
public purposes; that he adom the city and show zeal for the cult of the gods; thathe honor good
rrien and discipline in the spirit of a father; that he support both rich and poor or align himself with
the stronger faction; and that he cultivate rriilitary qualities, avoid sexual offense, anci moderate his •
pleasures.

Irieffect, Aristotle asks the tyrant to give up the very things he became a tyrant to

enjoy--that he not exalt himself, bully his subjects, or indulge his appetites. The tyrant, in other
words, is instru~ted to act contrary to the defining principie of the regime.15 Tiie lesson that
.

.

Aristotle conveys is that only through moderation can tyranny end\lre (with a similar lesson for the
other deviant regimes).16 Nature, it seenÍs; is so constituted as to favor limitation and restraint.
And nature is "lawful" in ·that the grasping and unrestrained ~ destroyed. On_the surface
Aristotle's teaching respecting tyranny is similar to Machiavelli's, but in fact they are profoundly.
opposite. •Machiavelli would have the prince choose freely from the two modes of tyranny
depending on what circumstances required.' Keeping pace with circumstances is all fmportant, and
if done well ensures the prince in his tyranny (Orwin, 1978, pp. 1218-19). The reason given by
Machiavelli is that nature favors the audacious over the cautious; nature condones tyranny
(Machiavelli, 1970, pp. 118-24). Thus Machiavelli's prince, set free by nature, is fully a tyrant,
whereas Aristotle' s tyrant, constrained by nature, is indistinguishable from a king.17 According to
Aristotle, deviant regimes can best survive by ceasing to be deviant; moderation, Aristotle explains,
is in the rulers' self-interest.

2. Mixed Re gimes
The one regime still to be discussed is polity. Polity is first introduced as the correct form of
rule by the many (3.7.3), also as a regime where the people possess military virtue (3.7.4, 2.6.16),
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and later as a democratic regime under law (3.17.4 ). Mainly though polity is a mixed re gime, one
which includes the rich, the poor, and the middle class--if a middle class exists (4.8.3, 4.12.4-6). It
is not the only mixed regime, however, since aristocracy can be a mix of aristocrats, oligarchs, and
democrats (4.7.4), or simply of oligarchs and democrats if the balance of power is with the former
(4.8.3, 5.7.6); but polity is the mixture that is most prominent. As a mixed regime, polity is
noteworthy for its stability (5.7.6). Toe various classes of society share in sovereign power and are
thus secure, content, and supportive of the constitution. But in order to share, they must first make
their presence felt. A mixed re gime exists where the principal classes are sufficiently powerful that
their claims to rule are perforce recognized. In unitary regimes, by contrast, the ruled are politically
less important and can expect little more than to be governed with their consent. But why should
multiple claims to rule result in peaceful sharing of power instead of dissention and civil war?
Why, in other words, is a mixed regime stable?18 Aristotle does concede that not all mixtures are
stable; for example, a polity composed only of rich and poor is a perilous arrangement since each
party is anxious about slight increases in the power of its rival--and it is especially dangerous when
the balance between them is perfect (5.4.11). Aristotle suggests that in order for the mixture to
produce the desired results, a middle class is necessary. The material circumstances of the middle
class help it to avoid the arrogance and malice of the wealthy as well as the servility and envy of the
poor. The former are given to mastery, the latter to slavery, but only the middle class is well
equipped to rule and be ruled as citizens (4.11.5-9). Because of the moderation of the middle class
and of its ability to negotiate the differences between the two extremes, a mixed regime featuring a
middle class is the most free of factional disturbance and the one most stable (4.11.12).
Aristotle, however, does not confine his analysis of stasis in mixed regimes to this one
sociological observation.19 After all, the middle class is arare occurrence, and nothing much is
done to make its appearance more common.20 In fact, Aristotle has other means to promote civic
concord in mixed regimes, including those mixed regimes called aristocracies. In book 2, where
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Aristotle faults Socrates for wanting too much_unity, he offers reciproca! equaiity and rotation in
.

.

.

office as substitute solutions to the problem of faction (2.2.4-6). Reciproca! equality is distributive·
.

.

justice--_giving classes power proportionate to their contribution. Reciproca! equality malees people
friends because all believe that they are being treated fairly (2.5.3-5). But does redprocl.ty _actually
solve the problem of faction, as Aristotle affirms, or is recipl'.ocityitself a major·cause of faction., as
Aristotle also affirms (5.1.3-5)? It happens· that people quarrel óver the true rrieaning of distributive .
justice .. Oligarchs believe that inequality of possessions means inequality in all things politically
consequential; thus oligarchs shonld rule. Democrats believé that equality of freedom, sucb as free
birth, means _equalityof power, thus the majority of the freébom should rule (3.9.4, 5.1.3-4, 6.3.-12). lf either faction is excluded,_it is wont to think itself abused anq. to conspire against the regime.

a

But if the factions share the offices, as in mixed regime, they are likely to bring their discontents
with them into the govemment, quarreling instead over the precise distributions of power. The ortly
remedy for people judging in their own case and handicapped by fallible reasoning is that they be.
educated so as to appreciate arid respect their counterpart's positión. It is not enough for democrats
to behave as parti_sansinside institutional arrangements that provide them sufficient power to protect
their interests. They must also adopt the perspective of oligarchs, just as oligarchs must think as
democrats, while both must respect and emulate aristocrats. Toe success of a mixed regime
depends on the creation of a single community (4.11. 7-8), and this in tum, if a middle class is
absent, depends on the kind of political education that Aristotle, acting as legislator, attempts to
provide (Yak, 1986, pp. 22-23).
In book 3, chapter 13, Aristotle considers the case of a pluralistic city where multiple
claimants to rule are present--the good, the wealthy, the wellborn, and the many (3.13.4-5).
Aristotle sifts through their arguments with an eye to finding and establishing the most suitable
unitary regime. But the justice of a unitary regime is itself challenged by the existence of so many
prominent classes (3.13.2-4),21 and the thrust of the chapter is to malee each class receptive to the
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opinions of its opponents. Thus the net result, though not stated explicitly, is power sharing in a
mixed regime.
Aristotle
very quickly shows that no defining principle (wealth, freedom, virtue) is in. the •
.
.

.

.

complete interest of those who advance and defend it (Jaffa, 1972, pp. 113-14), für every principle
is· subject to monarchi~al usurpation. If_the Wealthy m_eritrule by reason of their property, then the
wealthiest among them deserves to rule those of les ser fortunes. Similarly, free .birth must surrendér
to good .birth, aristocr~tic virtue to kingly virtue; and strength of nu~bers to the greater strength of
.

.

talent or resources (3.13.7-8, 6.3.3). But lest this line of argument too neatly.conclude for the rule
.

.

of one, Aristotle mentions, and to_a surprising degree condones, the practice of ostracism. Toé
excellent risk banishnient since pronounced superiórity is inconsistent with the equality needed for
politics and the rule of law Ó.13.13-23). •
The above admonition serves to dampen the fires of righteousness and _fanaticismwhich
might otherwise inflame adherents to the competing principles of rule. What is next required is for
the·members of each class to see the political landscape from the vantage of its rivals. In _chapter11
Aristotle defends the collective judgment of the many. As a group, the many are better judges of
musical and poetic productions, just as taken together they can provide a dinner more sumptuous
and various than that hosted by the few. The particular advantage of collective judgment is
comprehensiveness--nothing passes undetected when the many bear witness. Thus were the many
to deliver a literary review, their presentation would cover every conceivable aspect of the work.
Aristotle proceeds to liken the virtuous individual to a painting in which all the excellent parts that
nature normally scatters about are arranged into one beautiful ensemble. But no matter how
wonderful the painted eye or ear, says Aristotle against this individual, somewhere in nature there is
a real eye orear that surpasses it (3.11.2-4). The multitude represent a great warehouse of human
virtue needing only sorne organization and assembly in order to become politically useful; they are
the audience who see everything in the play but who require a theater critic to bring coherence to
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their observations. Given this potential--and Aristotle cautions that not every multitude is so good
(3.11.5)--the many need not be prejudiced by appeals to excellence. Collective judgment is thus
defended aristocratically, in terms of its contribution to excellence, rather than on grounds that all
opinions are equal. Treated as colleagues in an aristocratic venture, the democratic multitude are
given an interest in aristocracy and are more inclined to share its values.
In chapter 15 Aristotle repeats this procedure but in reverse--he provides a democratic
argument to defend aristocracy. The question in 15 concerns the corruptibility of judgment and the
likelihood that a single individual is more prone to corruption than a crowd. Nevertheless, the
choice favors the judgment of the one individual unless the many are good men and good citizens-aristocrats in other words. Aristocracy is susceptible to factional conflict, Aristotle admits, and this
is an argument against it. But still he prefers aristocracy to k:ingship because of the security against
corruption which numbers provide:
lf, then, the rule of a number of persons who are all good men is to be
regarded as aristocracy, and the rule of a single personas k:ingship,
aristocracy would be more choiceworthy for cities than kingship ...
provided it is pos sible to find a number of persons who are similar
(3.15.10).
There is no issue more central to the Politics than the best regime and no question more urgent to
political men than who should rule. Here Aristotle decides this matter in favor of aristocracy using
what is essentially a democratic argument--where there is rough equality of virtue, numbers are
determinative. The aristocrats find themselves protected against kingship by the utility and justice
of equality. Although accustomed to arguing their case in terms of excellence, they are made to see
that democratic equality, and majority rule as its corollary (we aristocrats should rule because we
are more numerous than a king), can serve their interests just as wen.22
We pass over the wellborn and the wealthy because it is thought that as classes they are not
so distinctive. Good birth is either a variation on free birth, or it is an accompaniment of wealth and
virtue (3.13.2-3, 4.8.9). And wealth is a commodity valued by the rich and poor alike. Toe class of
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wealthy oligarchs divid~ between the democratic multitude who join them in their love of money,
and the aristocratic few who share with them a love of honor. In effect they disappear as a class,
leaving the field to democrats and aristocrats. The real ideological battle in politics then is between
excellence and equality rather than between wealth and freedom. This is not to say that aristocrats
fight with democrats, for it is reported that aristocrats are the least likely to force their claim to rule
(5.1.6, 5.4.12); nor does it mean that democrats and oligarchs live happily in peace, for the contest
between rich and poor is the central drama of politics (5.9.10). What is meant instead is that the
defining principies of aristocracy and democracy are at the furthest remove and that therefore they
are the most difficult to reconcile. Aristocrats are wont to feel contempt for democratic freedom
which is private, purposeless, and without standards--i.e., egalitarian. Likewise democrats are
likely to feel threatened by the ambition and presumption that marks the aristocratic pursuit of
excellence. Making friends of these two classes is a serious political challenge. As a practica!
measure, and apart from the instruction explained above, Aristotle :recommends the following
remedy: "a very great thing in every regime is to have the laws and management of the rest
arranged in such a way that it is impossible to profit from the offices" (5.8.15).23 Although
Aristotle maintains that oligarchy has the most to benefit from such a law, his subsequent discussion
focuses on democracy and aristocracy:
Indeed, the only way it is possible for democracy and aristocracy to exist
together is if someone instituted this. For it would then be possible for
both the notables and the multitude to have what they want. Having it
open to all to rule is characteristic of democracy; having the notables in
the offices is characteristic of aristocracy. But this is what will happen
when it is impossible to profit from the offices. The poor will not want to
rule on account of not profiting, but rather will want to attend to their
private affairs; the well off will be able to rule because they will need
nothing from the common [funds]. The result for the poor is that they will
become well off through spending their time at work; for the well off, that
they will not be ruled by ordinary persons. To prevent the stealing of
common [funds], then, let the transfer of funds occur in the presence of all
the citizens, and let records of this be deposited with each clan, company,
and tribe. But to ensure profitless rule, there should be legislation
assigning honors to those of good reputation (5.8.17-19).
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Aristotle stated that every re gime is advantaged by having the profit taken out of poli tics, but the
main advantage is that it allows the notables (hoi gnorimoi) to rule under the supervision of the
many. Such an arrangement, however, produces a mixed regime of the aristocratic k:ind. Thus the
advantage of profitless officeholding to every re gime is that it turns every re gime into a mixed
aristocracy. And let it be noted that the oligarchs have disappeared as a separate class--either they
are money-loving and are out of politics--with the many, pursuing their private affairs; or they are
well off (euporoi), indifferent to profit, and in politics for the honor of it; i.e., they are
timocratic/aristocratic. 24

Before leaving this review of actual cities and actual regimes, mention is in order of the
method used by Aristotle to organize the empirical evidence bearing on faction. He never quite
says so, but his account of faction in the early chapters of book 5 seems to rely on the four operative
causes outlined in the Physics (2.3): efficient, material, formal, and final. For instance, faction has
its efficient cause in the beginning points, occasions, and opportunities (1302a21: archai) which
trigger civil unrest. These include, to name but a few, fear of punishment, contempt for the rulers,
and election intrigue. Toe material cause of faction is the unsuitability of a regime to its people, a
disproportion that occurs at sorne time in the re gime' s history or at the moment of its founding
(1302b3: auxesin ten para to analogon; 1302b5: anomoioteta).25 An increase of the poor in an
oligarchic regime oran extreme democracy forced upon an agrarian people are examples (6.1.8).
The formal cause (1302a20: pós te echontes) is the disagreement among citizens about who should
rule, those disputes over distributive justice and reciproca! equality. "Factional conflict," Aristotle
declares, "is everywhere the result of inequality, at any rate where there is no proportion among
those who are unequal" (5.1.11). The last is final cause (1302a21: tin5n heneken), or the objectives
people pursue when they resort to faction. There are two objectives which Aristotle allows: profit
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(kerdos) and honor (time). The many want profit, while the few seek honor. To all of these causes
the solution is fondainentally the sáme, namely institutiónal arrangements and adjustments in the
distribution ofpower such that a majority of the people always supports the regime (4.12.1, 5.9.5,
6.6:2).

. 3. The Ideal Regime
• Theré is a still more serious cause of stasis which no amount of institutional tinkering will
cure, and consideration of it will serve a:san introduction to Aristotle '~ ideál city. The underlyirig
cause, says Aristotle, is human depravity (mochtheria). Bad people--the vicious, the greedy, the
unjust--iack control of their appetites and are unable to live amicably with others. They are the
natural enemies.of good people who are constant, reliable, and attentive to the comnionweal
(N.E•.1167b5-16). ;'The greatest factional split is perhaps that between virtue and depravity".
(5.3.16).26 What then is to be done with the bad? If it is possible-~as it might be.in the founding of
a new city, especially a city oí one's dreams~-the bad should be excluded from membership. The
legislatór should not even attempt to work his art cm those whose natures are unpromising and
whose evil ways are likely to defeat all efforts at correction. The city can be no better than its
human material. A good city, therefore, will not admitas citizens those who lack spirit (thumos)
and thought (dianoia), such as the barbarians of excessively cold and excessively hot climates
(7.7.2-4). For those who pass inspection and are admitted, their own wicked tendencies can best be
controlled by an education designed to moderate desire (2.7.8, 12). Education is the principal
means whereby the potentially good become good in fact, and the principal means for averting
future problems of faction. But poverty can also be a cause of faction (2.6.13);27 thus sorne
additional advantage is to be found in equalizing property. The advantage though "is by no means a
great one" (2.7 .18), since equality of possessions causes disaffection among those who believe
themselves more than equal. The final judgment seems then to be that equalization of property is an
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uncertain good at best. On the other hand, communization of property is a manifest evil. True,
"this sort of legislation has an attractive face and might be held humane; he who hears of it accepts
it gladly, thinking it will produce a marvelous affection in all for each other" (2.5.11). But in reality
communism offends most people's sense of justice and makes the difficult business of living
together to be more difficult still (2.5.3-4). Civil concord (homonoia) is more surely provided if
property is prívate and its use communal. A community is blessed if there is affection (philia)
among the people. "For we suppose affection to be the greatest of good things for cities, for in this
way they would least of all engage in factional conflict" (2.4.6). Affection exists among similar
people, people who are spirited in temperament (7.7.5-7), joined together by marriage (3.9.13), and
partners in a common enterpríse. "The city wishes," says Aristotle, "... to be made up of equal and
similar persons to the extent possible" (4.11.8). Between dissimilar and unequal people--slaves and
masters at the extreme--there can be no affection and no political partnership, for "the ones are
consumed by envy, the others by contempt" (4.11. 7). A perfect city, an ideal city, is composed of
good, spirited, and like-minded people, who because of these qualities feel affection for one
another; and the property arrangement that is suited to their partnership is prívate possession and
public use (7.10.9, 2.4.9).
These reflections, scattered throughout the Politics, provide the rationale for Aristotle's ideal
city, at least as regards the subject of faction. Now one notes that this city of his prayers is in two
respects homogeneous. First, the citizens are more alike than those in existing unitary regimes
because they are products of a common education that seeks to make them good through habituation
and instruction (8.1.3-4) (nature having made them freedom-loving and capable of ruling, i.e.,
spiríted and thoughtful).28 As adults they lead similar lives of leisure, lives devoted to virtue,
culture, and politics. They are property owners, with land on the border and at the center to give
them common interests (7.10.11) (although differences of fortune are permitted since sorne citizens
are expected to be too poor to contribute to the common messes [7.10.10]). All are politically
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active as soldiers, govemors, and priests, depending on age. And since each age group receives its
tum at rule, there is less resentment of those who actually hold the deliberative and judicial offices:
Nature has provided the distinction by making that which is the same by
type have a younger and an older element, of which it is proper for the
former to be ruled and the latter to rule. No one chafes at being ruled on
the basis of age or considers himself superior, particularly when he is
going to recover his contribution when he attains the age to come (7.14.5).
In effect, the city is a family, with duties and powers distributed appropriately among the
genera:tions.
But the city is also a materially self-sufficient association. In additfon to citizens there

are

workers in this community, f armers, niechanics, and ttadesinen. Of ~ourse the same holds true of
.

.

all unitary regimes, that an inferior class of workers cohabit the territory with citizens. But in these
cities the workers aré free people who expect to be ruled voluntarily and often·are; whereas in
Aristotle's ideal city, the ~orkers are slaves or spiritless barbarians.29 Because other cities are
heterogeneous, composed of at least two classes, the ruling class is obligedto deal politically30·
with the ruled, if only because their presence is a threat to the stability of the regime. But the ruled
.

.

in Aristotle' s city_are politicáll y irrelevant _:and this is the s.econd sense in which the city is
homogeneous. The ruled are slaves, and the slaves of this city pose little danger of rebellion since
Aristotle "prays for" their pusillanimity and ethnic dissimilarity (7.10.13, 2.5.25). It is as if the city
were populated by ideal citizens only, with material necessities provided by anímate tools (1.4.2), or
by the human equivalent of machines (Strauss, 1964, p. 37). Under such circumstances the problem
of faction is of minimal import, because the diversity is missing of which faction is born: by nature
and by nurture all citizens are politically competent and morally good--the servile and the depraved
are removed; all belong to the ruling class and among themselves relate generationally 1 as children
(soldiers), parents (rulers), and grandparents (priests); property is private and in varying amounts,
but its use is partly common; moreover, the chief purpose of private property is to promote likemindedness and affection among citizens. Although the city is constructed more for the sake of
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virtue than for the sake of stability, still the homogeneity of the virtuous proves to be the city's
primary cure for faction. Aristotle ·auacks Socrates for homogenizing the city too much, but .
.

.

Aristotle acknowledges that homógeneity is a valuable means for promoting domestic harmony:
"FÓrjust as in war the crossing of ditches, eveil if they are small, splits apart the ranks, so every
difference, it appears, makes a factional split" (5.3.16): Aristotle, as it were, has filled in most of
the ditches and has evened the terrain over which his_army of citizens will match.
• What then has become of Aristotle's argument that the city, a diverse and self-sufficient
compound, is unlike the family and superior to it because "what is less_a miity is more choiceworthy
than what is more a unity" (2.2.8)? Is Aristotle's ideal city any less unified than Socrates'
Republic? _Tobe sure, Aristotle does not eliminate·the family, private possessions, or sexual
differentiation. But then he understands these institutions and differences to be conducive to civil
concord, and he accuses Socrates of electing means incongruous with the end of civil unity. At the
very moment when Aristotle is éhampioning diversity; in book 2, he is also explaining the
conditions for the successful unification of the city; namely, the léssons of love, piety, and
ownership as tau&"htby the family.31 Furthermore, Aristotle nowhere introduces a pbilosopher
king, as does Socrates, nor are his age-based distinctions within the ruling class as constant a barrier
as Socrates' educational division of guardians and warriors; and his working class, being all or
mostly slaves, are less politically visible than Socrates' farmers and artisans. Socrates' Republic
begins with the division of labor--one man, one art--and ends with a class society. Aristotle's polis,
on the other hand, is a place where equals rotate through office; and in his ideal city there is such
singleness of purpose that the same education is given to a11citizens--for it is said that the individual
belongs not to himself but to the whole (8.1.3-4 ). It is at least arguable, therefore, that the best city
of Socrates' devising contains more interna! diversity than Aristotle's ideal.
Aristotle said of diversity that its purpose in part is to provide the material base of the city's
existence. This much of the original position is retained, for there are slaves and metics who do the
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work of society: But it was also, and more importantly, said that diversity is needed for selfsufficiency, that self.:sufficiency makes for happiness, and that happiness is a matter of practicing
.

.

virtue. The city's diversity was ctediteci with turning amoral children (family members) into
morally mature adults (free_and equal citizens). Their virtue, of course, was practica! in nature-deliberating about good·and evil in order to do the good (N.E. 1095a6). If the city were a school
·and its citizens philosophers, then presumably no limit todjversity would be necessary, for the
wider the range of opinions, the better the chances of reaching truth through debate. But since its
people are less than philosophers, and since its purpose is action rather thari thought, the city needs
agreement and thus a limit to diversity. This limit has its focal point in the .regime, for the regÍme
itself represents agreement and choice respecting the most central political question, namely, who is
worthy and who should rule. Moral dispute the~ takes place ;ithin the context of a regime. But
regimes are good and bad with numerous gradations in between. What is the value of deliberatiort _
about the advantageous and the just in abad regime? Is it of any moral benefit, for instánce, to have
oligarchs ·debate their strategy for despoiling·the poor,_those oligarchs who take an oath to treat the
poor with malice and conterript (5.9.11)? One recalls that Aristotle argues in book 3 that a good
person must be a citizen of a good regime, to say nothing of being the ruler of a good regime
(3.5.10). Apparently the political life of citizens in bad regimes counts for little morally. But does
diversity help to bring about good regimes? Perhaps. Diversity brings about faction. If properly
handled, faction can lead to the compromise of a mixed regime--and a mixed regime is preferable to
a badregime.32 But mixed govemment is not on the same plane with aristocracy. Compared with
the best, mixed govemment is itself a deviation (parekbasis), for where there is a mixed regime,
aristocrats must accommodate themselves to the lesser standards of democrats and oligarchs.

Such

diversity of standards is injurious to aristocrats, since political debate proceeds on the assurnption
that freedom and wealth are more admirable than virtue, or that all principies are equal. Again,
were it Aristotle's purpose to make his aristocrats philosophers,33 then the challenge of defending
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virtue before the freedom-loving and the money-loving would be beneficia!. But given Aristotle's
distinction between being virtuous and kriowing virtue, his aristocrats do not need the company of •
democrats an4 oligarchs in order to develop themselves spiritually--for theirs is a "partnership of •
.

.

similar persons for the sake of alife that is the·best possible" (7.8.4).34 In Aristotle's ideal_city,
d1versity is replaced by a public education that endeavors to make all citizens good, not by the clash
of opinions in a marketplace of ideas, but by exhortation, habituation, and law; using the morally
serious man of the NicomaChean Ethics, the spoudaios, as the model.

IV. Conclusion •
.

.

Aristotle's theory of faction is tailored _toeach of the three variations of the civic compound.
In sorne cities the ru1ers go~em themselves· and their class as ~embers of a political partnership, but.
are also joined in an economic alliance to other classes which complete the city by contributing to .
.

.

its material self-sufficiency. These are the unitary re.gimes, and they are either correct or devian:t.
Correct régimes guard against'faction by protecting the interests Óf the govemed; .they rule with
consent But they are still nót durable sincé the effect of city-living is to encourage the
disfranchized to seek a political life and a partnership that is more than contractual. Deviant
regimes are even less durable since their selfish injustice induces the ruled to rebel. In order to
stabilize themselves they must imitate the justice of their counterparts or share power with the ruled
and gradually surrender their identities as unitary regimes.
The city govemed by a unitary regime is in fact two cities, usually one of the rich and one of
the poor. But where a mixed regime is in power, there the city is single and whole, forno class of
free persons is excluded from office. Power sharing is the principal means by which a mixed
regime diffuses factious discontent. But if the city is not blessed with a middle class, then
something additional is needed to keep ali elements living together in harmony. This something is
an education designed to teach the meritorious their interest in equality and the mediocre their
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capacity for excellence .. Aristotle hünself supplies this education in the Poli tics; but it is expected
that regimes will teach these same lessons to their citizens.
The ideal city is also ·ªsingle city because its working class of slaves and metics is
poÜtically insignificant and because everyone else is regarded a citizen. Also/citizenship in the
.

.

ideal city is a far more homogenizing experience than it is in any other city, because a citizen here is·
fully set in his character by the education of the re gime and,becáuse all citizens,. with allowances
made for age, lead comparable li~es of leisure. Aristotle's city-to-be-prayed-for is homogeneous
then in these two respects, and it relies ón this homogeneity as its remedy for faction. Thus in the
contest between Socratic unity and Mádisonian diversity, Aristotle, in the end, comes to side with
Socrates. ·
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Notes
1Transl~tions of the Politics are from Lord (1984); also from Lord are book, chapter, and •
section divisions, which are the sáme as those found iri Barker (1958). Where more precise
.

.

identification is required, the Bekker page numbers are used, with line citations corresponding to
those in the Oxford Classical Text (1957).
2Three of th~se functions also contribute to the good life. Thus those permitted to exercise
them arecounted as full paitners in the associatÍon, as citizens ..
3The distinction in Aristotle between unified and diverse associatioils might be compared to
.

.

.

.

.

•

Emile Durkheim's discussion of mechanical and organic solidarity, to his· critique of economié ·
libertarianism, and to his plea for reviving the corporation as a kind of industrial polis (1933, pp. 132, 70-232).
.

.

4 Aristotle can be granted his initial point that the family is more unified than the city: the
family approximates on the collective level the unity and oneness of the individua]. But in othet .
respects the relation is reversed, for the household is composed or discrete parts (male~female,
master-slave) with property related to specified and limited needs; whereas the polis is populated by
equal citizens who rule and are ruled in turn; it also is the place where homogenized currency
(money) renders commensurate unlike things. From this latter perspective, the city seems
homogeneous and the household diverse. See Booth (1981, pp. 222-25), Saxonhouse (1982, pp.
211-13), and Blits (1985, p. 223).
5conversations about the advantageous and the just (1.2.1) are not the only way that the city
teaches virtue. It also habituates through education and law and uses coercion to make parental
authority effective (Nicomachean Ethics 1179b31-1180a24; hereafter N.E.). Like the city, the
household is a moral association (1253a18), but it is incomplete for want of diversity and power.
See Blits (1985, pp. 234-38).
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6This is not to deny that the larger part of Aristotle's critique concerns the failure of
Socrates to achieve complete unity by means of communist insti.tutions. Aristotle's own preference
for unity over diversity will be discussed below, at which point sorne attention will be paid to this
much debated issue.
7Political tranquillity is not Socrates' only interest in unity. He attacks the family, and more
generally things private and particular, in order to prepare the way for philosophy, as that thing
which is truly public and universal. See Strauss (1964, p. 115), Bloom (1968, p. 387), and
Saxonhouse (1982, p. 218).
8Qther precauti.ons and institutions serving to control the effects of faction are separation of
powers, bicameralism, representation, federalism, and a written constitution. See especially
Federalist 9 and 51.
9Barker (1959, pp. 403-5) maintains that Aristotle is unlike modem contract theorists in
regarding the state as a moral unity, and that he is unlike Plato in thinking that differenti.ated unity is
the cause of self-sufficiency and individual excellence.
lOJt is reasonably clear that Aristotle lays greater stress on the political than on the social or
the cultural. But the formati.ve power of the regime spoken of in book 3 (3.3.8-9) is amended
appreciably in later books where it is said that the regime must be compatible with the people (e.g.,
6.4.1). Matter limits form almost as muchas form shapes matter. For a critica! discussion of the
influence of the polis and the regime, see Newman (1973, pp. 69-83).
11Yak (1986, pp. 25-28) speaks of the different kinds of friendship, equal and unequal,
present in the political community.
12Newman (1973, pp. 527-28) goes further and says that Aristotle's teaching on revolution
is inconsistent. But Newman treats the middle books as a wholly disti.nct secti.on of the Poli tics and
seems disturbed that all remarks bearing on revolution and faction are not gathered therein.
13Polity will be treated as a mixed regime.
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14Where thereis equality, Aristotle often remarks, the people must share in the exercise of •
power (2.2.6, 3.16.2.:3, 4.11.8, 5.8.6).
15Qligarchs and democrats are similarly instructed, for they are told to educate the •
population in a manner consistent with the regíme. "But to be educated relative to the

regime is not

to do the things that oligarchs or those who want democracy .enjoy, but rather the things by which
the former will be able to run an oligarchy and the latter to have a regime that is run democratically"
(5.9.13). Olígarchy values ·wealth; it is thus incumbent on those who rule to make wealth •
respectable. Likewise, democracy valués freedom; thus. democrats must behave so as to preserve
freedom' s good name. In an oligarchy conspicuous consumption should be avoided, and in a
democrácy living as one wants should be discouraged.
• 16Mulgan (1977, p. 134) tends to hold this conclusion against Aristotle, who he thinks is
obliged to devise constitutional remedies consistent with the nature of each constittition; thus only .
extremely democratic measures can be employed to correct the defíciencies of extreme democra:cy.
But Aristotle would never allow that people can have whatever they want, or that.it is bis job as a
political scientist to tell .theni how to get it. •The most he can do is to show why certain desires are
unattainable--hence his conviction that moderation is the essence of virtue (virtue as the mean) and
that virtue is the cause of happiness. There is no point in the Politics where Aristotle dons the cap
of the value-free empiricist, ignoring the importance of moderation to human welfare.
17Morral ( 1977, p. 100) discounts any difference, thinking Aristotle and Machiavelli to be
similarly averse to tyranny.
18Thomas Hobbes, for one, believes that a mixed regime is the least stable of all, a political
monstrosity that will either fly apart or convert itself into a unitary regime (1968, pp. 372-73; 1978,
pp. 194, 248-49).
19Morral (1977, p. 93) finds nothing else in Aristotle's treatment of faction besides his
introduction of the middle class.
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20 Aristotle poínts out that a middle class more frequently occurs in a large city than in a
small city, and that most re gimes ate either democratic ór oligarchic because· they lack the middle
element (4.11.12-16). Although a·middle class is a furiction of size, and understood to be such,
corispicuously absent from the Poli tics is any effort to foster a middle-class polity· by extending the
size of the city. (If a middle class polity also depends on wealth-..:enoughto make sonie of the poor
moderate property owners--then it should be noted as well that Aristotle objects to the kind of
economic aciivity that would most likely produée-wealth, namely c~ematismos, or bu_siness.
Regarding Aristotle's treatment of acquisition, see Barker, 1959, p. 376; Néwmari, 1973, pp. 13435; Brown,-1982;pp. 171-90; Nichols, 1983, p. 179;Ambler, 1984, pp. 490-98; 1985, p. 174.) As
explained above, a large city or state"forfeits the moral self-sufficiency óf a polis. For Aristotle, a
small city is a given,"and what remains optional is the regime--e.g., the best simply, the best
generally, the best for this or that people. For James Madison; on the other hand--and in the context
of revolutionary America--a republican re gime is a g1ven, and what people contest is the size of the
territory.
21At the start ofchapter 13, Aristotle repeats the point that those who contribute to the city's
good life have the best claim to rule and that equality or inequality in sorne one thing ought not to
be extended to everything political, for "all re gimes of this sort are necessari1y deviations."
Aristotle then proceeds to consider regimes that "dispute justly in a certain way, but not justly in an
unqualified sense." Included in these regimes is aristocracy. Aristotle states that the wealthy, the
free, and the wellborn have a claim, and "in a similar way (homoios] ... virtue has ajust claim in
the dispute" (1283a37-38). See also 3.13.8-9.
22see 5.6.7 where this same argument is applied to oligarchs.
23 At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Benjamin Franklin recommended that no
salary be paid to the executive (June 2) (orto the senators (June 261, and that only moderate
remuneration be granted to representatives (June 12]). He reasoned that love of power and love of
money were the two passions having the greatest influence on the behavior of men; that "separately
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each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same
object, they have in many minds the most violent effects .... And of what kind are the men who will
strive for this profitable pre-eminence ... ? It will not be the wise and the moderate ....

It will be

the bold and the violent. ... " Franklin's proposal was politely seconded, then tabled and forgotten.
(Farrand, 1966, pp. 82, 216, 427.)
24Toere are other institutional arrangements that are good for domestic harmony and that
seem appropriate to a mixed regime. They are alluded to by Aristotle but left mostly undeveloped.
Still they are worth mentioning, if only because they malee Aristotle look like the forefather of
liberal democracy. In book 2 Aristotle speaks of the division of power among Spartan kings. To its
proponents this division is an important means of preventing factional conflict (2.9.30). Aristotle
though seems unconvinced and to prefer an education which would malee gentlemen of the kings.
Even so, the idea of dividing governmental power as a cure for faction is on the table. But Aristotle
adds to it, in a fashion, when he delineates in book 4 the three functions or branches of government.
He never quite proposes the separation of these functions as a safeguard against tyranny; rather his
purpose is to fit the right arrangement of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the right
regime. But throughout the discussion there is an interest in achieving balance and moderation so
as to minimize the chances of factious discontent (e.g., 4.14.12-16). Along the same lines Aristotle
warns against the concentration of political and economic power and counsels their separation
(5.8.13-14). And with an eye toward efficiency, as opposed to justice, he recommends
specialization of functions (4.15.6) and even, in sorne cases, decentralization or localism (4.15.9).
Also mentioned in passing is legislative representation (4.14.13) and, at somewhat greater length,
popular control of executive offices through election and audits (6.4.5-7). When discussing polity,
Aristotle advises various strategies for mixing democratic and oligarchic elements, such as a system
of incentives and disincentives to achieve a balanced participation of the social classes (Resnick,
1979, pp. 78-85); he concludes that the best mix is one that defies precise identification (4.9.2-4, 6).
Finally, he suggests certain voting arrangements which sound suspiciously like bicameralism. Of
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course the term is not used, but the proposal in book 6, chapter 3 that the rich and_the poor be
provided separate voting seems to ámount to the sanie thing: each body is to vote, with the votes
weighted by propeity assessments; .if there is a difference in outcome, the majority of one joins with
.

.

the minority _ofthe other-.:.andvice versa--and the larger of the two combined votés wins the
decision. In this case, as in most of the cases above, the purpose is to control faction by díspersing
power among all of the relevant groups. (Jaffa [1972, p. 1l9] súggests that thé purpose is
addítionally io encourage the poorer of the rich and the richer of the poor to combine against the
extremes, thus creating a middle class íriterest.)
25The three begínning points and causes (tas·archas kai tas aitias)·spoken of by Aristotle at
1302a18 are here incréased to four by identifying two "material" c~uses·within the list of eleven
"efficient" causes given at 1302a37-1302b5.
26Lord trarislates is6s as perhaps. •An ~lternate rendering is in like manne~,"whichif used •
would remove the note of unceriainty from Aristotle; s ·s~atement.
27Wheeler (1951,.pp. 151-55) díscusses the economic factors at ·work in faction ·but regards
.

'

•

.

Marxisfinterpretations as out of place. Likewise Lintott (1982, pp. 257-58), who no~etheless gives primacy to the economic (p. 248). Barker (1959, p. 488) says that "the economic interpretation of
Greek stasis ... finds little support in [Aristotle's] pages."
28yak (1985) argues persuasively that political friendship for Aristotle is a mixture of
interest friendship and virtue friendship, and that the conflicting expectations associated with each
are a source of dísappointment, recrimination, and díssension. Because Aristotle accepts these
consequences, thinking them in fact useful for the citizen's rational development, Yak concludes
that the Aristotelian polis is marked by strife and that contemporary critics are mistaken who see the
polis as a nurturing, fraternal society and an implicit reproach to the alienation of liberal
contractarianism. But is Aristotle content to have the citizens of bis ideal community united--and
torn--by this political friendship so described? In order to replace the mixture with the comaraderie
of virtue friendship, Yak suggests, "one would have to find a way of turning [all citizens] into
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virtuous individuals" (p. 108). Yak presumes this to be impossible (also Yak, 1986, p. 25); but is
not communal virtue precisely what Aristotle is up to in books 7 and 8?
29Qnly of the farmers does Aristotle actually say that they are slaves or barbarians laking in
spirit. The other workers are not described, except that as necessities (anagkaia) of the city, rather
than as parts (moria), they are likened to the instruments of a craftsman (7.8.3). This, however, is
the same characterization that Aristotle elsewhere uses of slaves.
3Ü"Political" here is not used in the full sense to denote a partnership in a common moral
life; rather it refers to that lesser order of politics that regulates the contractual agreements of an
economic alliance.
31Qkin (1979, p. 85) notes an inconsistency in Aristotle's argument; she asks: "If doing
away with the family would severely dilute the bonds of kinship, how could it at the same time lead
to much unity?" A good question, to which the answer presumably is that it would not lead to much
unity; on the contrary, it would cause a general disaffection that would undermine the city's
friendship. Perhaps Aristotle' s position can be stated thus: Socrates erred in trying to turn the city
into a single human being by abolishing private families and private property; this could not be
done and should not be tried because real human beings, so reared, would relate to each other as
selfish and distrusting strangers; but by retaining private families and private property sorne
semblance of the communal family is possible, and--in light of books 7 and 8 of the Politics--even
desirable. On the significance of families and prívate property for civic philia, or homonoia, see
Saxonhouse (1982, pp. 214-16) and Dobbs (1985, pp. 36-41); Blits (1985, pp. 229-34) provides a
discussion of piety.
32A polity seems to be the only regime that thrives on and is improved by spiritual diversity.
33see Lord (1982, pp. 34-35) whose thesis is that music education in Aristotle is primarily
moral rather than aesthetic, that it instructs adults as well as children, and that it is preferred as a
currículum to science or philosophy because it is within the reach of most people, which is to say
egalitarian. On the dubious status of philosophy in the city, see pp. 64-65.
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34What is truly the best association is friendship ámong philosophers. •But Aristotle does
hot regard such a relátionship as a suitable model for politics. The best for politics is a community
of the morally_virn:ious.
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